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THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF THE EU
There has been much debate on whether the European Union (EU) has 
the necessary international legal personality to conclude international 
agreements and consequently incur duties and liabilities. Unlike the Treaty 
of Rome, which established the European Community (EC), the Treaty of 
Maastricht (TEU), which established the EU, did not explicitly confer 
international legal personality, nor did die Member States take up the 
invitation to do so in the subsequent amending Treaties of Amsterdam and 
Nice. Those supporting the argument that the European Union has legal 
personality have advanced innovative theses to justify their position (e.g. by 
extension from the EC), whilst opponents have sought refuge in the classic 
theories on the establishment of legal personality ("will" and "objective") to 
oppose such developments.
The Member States' actions have not assisted the situation. Although not 
prepared to confer legal personality expressly on the EU, they have 
nevertheless amended the TEU (Article 24) so as to enable the EU Council 
to conclude treaties in matters concerning die Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters (PJCC), die 2 non-EC pillars. Article 24 agreements are concluded 
by die Council but it is not clear from its wording whedier they are 
concluded on behalf of die EU or on behalf of die Member States.
Article 24 states:
'When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or 
international organisations in implementation of this Title [CFSP], the Council, 
acting unanimously, may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as 
appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. The Council acting unanimously on 
a recommendation from the Presidency shall conclude such agreements. No 
agreement shall be binding on a member state whose representative in the Council 
states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; 
the other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply 
provisionally to them. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to matters falling 
under Title VI [PJCC]'.
Indeed, until recently, CFSP agreements have neatly side-stepped the 
issue and avoided a head-on collision. However, in April 2001 die EU 
Council adopted Decision 2001/ 352/CESP [2001] OJ E125/1, approving 
an Agreement concluded between die European Union and die Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on the activities of the European Union 
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in die FRY. This is die first time diat an 
international agreement has clearly and explicitly been concluded between 
the EU and a diird party. On earlier occasions there has always been an 
element of doubt as to die precise identity of die parties bearing rights and 
duties under such agreements. For example, in die 1994 Memorandum of 
Understanding establishing die EU's administration of Mostar, die EU was 
not formally a party to the agreement. The Memorandum was stated to be 
an agreement between the Member States of die EU "acting widiin die 
framework of the Union," the Member States of die Western European 
Union, etc, etc. Similarly in die Dayton Agreement, the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU 
Presidency merely signed as one of the witnesses.
Several questions arise which need to be addressed. Apart from 
constitutional ones (such as which EC/EU institutions should negotiate EU 
agreements which contain foreign policy aspects? Who should issue the 
mandate? Who supervises die negotiations? Who resolves the clashes 
between the Presidency and the European Commission?), questions also 
arise as to the judicial control and legal responsibility for breach of these 
agreements. Is diis an example of leaving to the courts what governments 
of EU Member States find expedient to leave unresolved?
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